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ACADEMIC FREEDOM AND LOYALTY OATHS
ARvAL A. Moius*
"Loyalty must arise spontaneously from the hearts of people who love their country
and respect their government."
-Mr. Justice Black, concurring in Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 532 (1958).
INTRODUCTION
What is academic freedom? It is not an unalloyed concept, and its meanings
have many hues and variations. Yet, put simply, but in a somewhat restrictive way,
academic freedom at least means that the men of learning within an institution de-
voted to scholarship must be free to engage in their pursuits. In this sense, academic
freedom applies to all scholars whether they be members of a faculty or student
body 2 Its specific referent is to that common calling of the intellectual life, the
pursuit and understanding of truth, which serves as the adhesive for an otherwise
amorphous group known as the community of scholars. In a more complex sense,
academic freedom also refers to a place of meeting and to a condition of society.
In years past, scholars performed their functions by gathering together in the
academy,3 the first of which was founded by Plato. In today's interdependent world,
the "academy" consists of our colleges and universities whose true functions, in a
free society, are threefold: the creation, communication, and conservation of knowl-
edge.4 It is on our campuses where one finds an immediate need for academic
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'See R. M. MAcIvER, AcADEaIc FREEDOM IN OUR TIME (1955). This book develops an analysis of
current American problems in academic freedom. For a thorough historical study limited to American
colleges and universities, see RIcLARD HOFs'rADTRR & VALTER METzGER, Tim DEVELOPMENT OF ACADEMIC
FREEDOM IN THE UNITED STATES (1955). For a history of freedom of teaching in schools below college
grade, see the works by HowARD K. BEALE, A HISTORY OF FREEDOM OF TEACHING IN AMERICAN SCHOOLS
(1941), and ARE AmERICAN TEACHERS FREE? (1936). For additional materials and their insightful
development see the excellent chapter on "Academic Freedom" in THOMAS I. EMERSON & DAVID HABER,
POLITICAL AND CIVIL RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES (1958). Also note, Machlup, On Some Misconceptions
Concerning Academic Freedom, 41 A.A.U.P. BULL. 753 (1955); Carr, Academic Freedom, the American
Association of University Professors, and the United States Supreme Court, 45 id. 5 (1959), and see In-
graham, Academic Freedom, ioX PROCEEDINGS OF THE AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL Soc'y 441 (1957).
2 For discussions of the student interest in academic freedom, see MAcIvER, op. cit. supra note I, at
205.23 (1955); FRANCES E. FALVEY, STUDENT PARTICIPATION IN CoLLEGE ADMINISTRATION (1952); and
Metzger, The German Contribution to the American Theory of Academic Freedom, 41 A.A.U.P. BULL.
2X14 (1955)- For a discussion of loyalty qualifications for students, scholarships and textbooks, see,
Willcox, Invasions of the First Amendment Through Conditioned Public Spending, 41 CONEs.LL L.Q.
12 (1955), and see, Note, 28 IND. L.J. 52o (1953).
a Academic freedom appears tied to its institutional fabric and is a modern term for an old, but still
excellent, idea. Its modern version seems to have emerged concurrently with the rise of the university
during the medieval period. For more discussion, see HAsrINs RAsDALL, THE UNIVERSITIES oF EUROPE
IN THE MIDDLE AGES (3 vOls., 1895) (F. M. Powicke & A. B. Emden, ed. 1936); PERCY S. ALLEN, Tim
Ao oF ERAsMUS (914), and IRENE PAlERxF, DIssENTING ACADEMIES IN ENGLAND (1914).
'See Greene, The Function of the School in a Modern Democratic Society, found in THOMtAS I.
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freedom and where one locates its practitioners. Yet, viewed in its implications
beyond our campuses, academic freedom has a social meaning. There appears to
be a direct and functional tie between faculty members' claims for academic freedom,
the true nature of our colleges and universities, and a continued flow of information
into our market place of ideas which is so vital for a free and democratic society.
The direct dependence of such a society upon free universities,5 and hence, upon
academic freedom, is obvious; and these pages need not be cluttered with its pro-
longed argument accompanied by documentation.
When a claim of academic freedom is made, it carries several necessary implica-
tions for conditions of employment, and the demands spring from the nature of the
claim itself. Within the confines of a university, knowledge is its own end, not
merely a means to an end.7 The essence of the institution is epitomized by the spirit
of free inquiry: to follow the argument wherever it may lead; to examine, question,
dispute, or rework customary ideas and beliefs. To a scholar unchallengeable dogma
and hypothesis are fundamentally incompatible, and the concept of an immutable
doctrine is repugnant to the very life spirit of a university. "The concern of its
true scholars is not merely to add and revise facts in relation to an accepted frame-
work, but to be ever examining and modifying the framework itself."8 One implica.
tion of academic freedom for the conditions of employment is, therefore, that, if it
is to carry out its calling, official governmental intervention must be excluded from
EMERSON & DAVID HABER, POLITICAL AND CIVIL RIGHTS IN TI UNTED STATES 972 (1958); R OI~ax
S. K. SEELEY, FUNCTION OF THE UNIVERSITY (1948); JOHN HENRY (Cardinal), NEWMAN, TIE IDEA OF A
UNIVERSITY (842), and Tauber, The Free University in an Open Society, 23 HAnV. EDuC. REV. 3 (1953).
' "University" and "college" are used synonymously with "higher education" throughout this article.
'For one who insists, however, he might consult the following: West Virginia v. Barnette, 319 U.S.
624 (1943), and AMERICAN HIsrORICAL Ass'N, REPORT OF THE CoIMIssiON ON SOCIAL STUDIES, CON-
CLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS (1934); JoHN DEWEY, DEMOCRACY AND EDUCATION (x916) and PROB-
LEMS OF MEN (1946); HERMAN H. HORNE, THE DEMOCRATIC PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION (1935); ALEX-
ANDER MEIKLEjOHN, EDUCATION BETWEEN TWO WORLDS (1942); NATIONAL EDUCATIONAL ASS'N, TIM
UNIQUE FUNCTION OF EDUCATION IN AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (1937); JoHN S. BRUBACHER, MODERN
PHILOSOPHIES OF EDUCATION (1950) and JOHN S. BRUBACHER (ED.), ECLECTIC PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION
(1951); and specifically for lawyer education, see Lasswell & McDougal, Legal Education and Public
Policy: Professional Training in the Public Interest, 52 YALE LJ. 203 (1943), reprinted in MYREs S. Mc-
DouGAL, STUDIES IN WORLD PUBLIC ORDER (596o). The general viewpoint of the above selections
might be contrasted with that reported in GEORGE F. KNELLER, THE EDUCATIONAL PHILOSOPHY OF NATIONAL
SOCIALIsM (1941); BORIS P. YEsIPOV & N. K. GONCHAROV, I WANT To BE LIRE STALIN (1947), and Munger,
Academic Freedom under Peron, 7 ANTIOCH REV. 275 (1947).
" I do not use the terms "knowledge" and "truth" to mean the same things. See MACIVER,
op. cit. supra note I, at 3-7- Broadly speaking, "truth" can be considered as those relationships and/or facts
which men discover, by their own operations, and its test is whether or not an asserted proposition is in
accord with the facts; that is, a statement is true when researchers agree that the fact or connection
it asserts has been found to exist. Knowledge, on the other hand, is neither the data, the figures, the
graphs, nor the instrument readings. Knowledge inheres in those conclusions which are rationally in-
ferred from the data. It can be considered as the entire body of relationships known to be true plus
their necessary conclusions and implications. In this sense then, truth and knowledge are mutually
interdependent, and for the genuine scholar the quest for knowledge is also a search for truth; they are
goals sought for their own sake, and never completely obtained. As H. T. Pledge states in his
book, SCIENCE SINCE 1500, at 54 (1947): "It is philosophies rather than scientific discoveries which
are persecuted." In short, knowledge.
'Sweexy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 263 (1956) (concurring opinion).
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the intellectual life of a university.9 Intellectual autonomy is crucial.'0 It matters
little whether the governmental intervention is direct and open, or covert and
clandestine, for, whatever its forms, if government tends to check the passion and
fearlessness of scholars, it will destroy fragile and indispensable qualities necessary
for fruitful intellectual labor. One thing is clear, the freedom to reason and dispute
on the basis of observation and experiment are the necessary conditions for the
generation of that ordered thought which we label "science." This same sense of
freedom is necessary to do creative work in the humanities and arts, the pursuit of
which, along with science, constitutes the university.
The continued development and protection of this "sense of freedom" is the prime,
and ultimately the only, responsibility of those official caretakers of the university: its
administration and its legislative body. It is their immediate task to create certain
conditions of scholarly employment, at least four, which are critical to a realization
of "the sense of freedom." Upon these academic caretakers is placed the continuing
responsibility of maintaining these conditions inviolate. These conditions have been
cast into words by a former Supreme Court Justice who has known well their rela-
tion to academic freedom and who has enjoyed an illustrious career at Harvard, Mr.
Justice Frankfurter:11
It is the business of a university to provide that atmosphere which is most conducive
to speculation, experiment and creation. It is an atmosphere in which there prevail "the
four essential freedoms" of a university-to determine for itself on academic grounds
who may teach, what may be taught, how it shall be taught, and who may be admitted
to study.
Besides having obvious implications for governing boards, presidents, and state
legislatures, the four essential conditions of academic freedom also have some neces-
sary implications for our society as a whole and for constitutional law. They work
out their manifestations in various ways, but are bound up, in their most immediate
sense, in a professorial claim for academic freedom. A researcher generally seeks
that freedom necessary to investigate an area, to locate data, to interpret his searches
into the general fabric of the knowledge available to him at the time, and com-
municate his considered conclusions to anyone willing to listen. Viewed in this
narrow perspective, the professor's immediate claim is for personal protection; that is,
the protection necessary to carry out his professorial functions without governmental
interference, and without fears of subsequent harassment or penalties being visited
upon him for his labors. This is no small claim when one considers its implications
for vested social interests, particularly when the claim is examined in relation to the
' "Academic freedom is the freedom of the teacher or research worker in higher institutions of
learning to investigate and discuss the problems of his science . . . without interference from political
or ecclesiastical authority or from the administrative officials of the institution in which he is employed,
unless his methods are found by qualified bodies of his own profession to be clearly incompetent or
contrary to professional ethics." I ENcyc. Soc. SC. 384 (193o).
'o See the inaugural address of University of Washington President, in CHAR.ES E. OnDoEAa, MAN
AND LEARNING IN MODERN SOCIETY 173 (1958).
11 Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 263 (956) (concurring opinion).
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conclusions that conceivably might emanate from courageous and challenging in-
vestigations into the fabric of our social order. Yet, obviously, such investigations
must be made if a democratic society is to function. "Teachers and students must
always remain free to inquire, to study and to evaluate, to gain new maturity and
understanding; otherwise our civilization will stagnate and die."'" Thus, in a
broader perspective, it can be seen that a professor's claim for academic freedom
really translates itself into a demand for protection, not only for himself, but into
a claim of protection for society's right to know. It is an instrument of democracy.
In this sense then, academic freedom, with its concomitant intellectual liberty for
the scholar and community alike, constitutes the very core of that freedom of speech
and association so basic to a free society and so carefully safeguarded by the first
amendment to our Constitution.
I
CONSTITUTIONAL RECOGNITION OF ACADEMIC FRtEEDOM
The clearest recognition by the United States Supreme Court that academic free-
dom lies at the core of the free speech guarantee of the first amendment, came with
its decision in Sweezy v. New Hampshire.'3 In i95i, that state enacted its Sub-
versive Activities Act ' which imposed criminal and civil penalties upon "subversive
persons."'5 Later, in 1953, the New Hampshire legislature, by resolution, empowered
the state attorney general to act as a one-man investigating committee whenever
he had information which ". . . in his judgment may be reasonable or reliable."
He was directed to investigate violations of the 1951 Act and to report to the
legislature on the needs for additional legislation. 6 Using this authority, the attorney
general sought to question Paul Sweezy, an editor,17 writer,'" and self-proclaimed
"socialist" and "classical Marxist." Sweezy testified freely and generally, but he
refused to answer any of two types of questions. Relying upon the first and four.
teenth amendments, he refused to answer questions concerning the New Hampshire
I Id. at 250.
i 354 U.S. 234 (1956); for discussion see, 7 BUFFALO L. REV. 267 (1958); 71 HAIv. L. Rzv. X41
(X957); 56 MICH. L. REV. 291 (1957), and 32 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1302 (957).
"N.H. REv. STAT. ANN §§ 588: 1-16 (955).
"
5 The first section provides that: "Subversive person means any person who commits, attempts to
commit, or aids in the commission, or advocates, abets, advises or teaches, by any means any person to
commit, attempt to commit, or aid in the commission of any act intended to overthrow, destroy or alter,
or to assist in the overthrow, destruction or alteration of, the constitutional form of government of the
United States, or the State of New Hampshire, or any political subdivision of either of them, by force, or
violence; or who is a member of a subversive organization or foreign subversive organization." The latter
two organizations are defined in terms almost identical to those above. The criminal penalty for violating
this act can be a fine of "not more than twenty thousand dollars, or imprisonment for not more than
twenty years, or both .. ." See § 588:2. On the civil side: "No subversive person ...shall be eligible
for employment in, or appointment to any office of ... this state . or other political subdivision of
this state." See § 588:9.
" N.H. Laws, 1953, ch. 307. Note discussion in Nelson v. Wyman, 99 N.H. 33, io5 A.2d 756 (954).
1 See, e.g., The Monthly Review.
1s See, e.g., PAUL M. SwE.zY, SOCIALISM (1949), and PAuL M. SwEaz,, THE TkEoitv o' C/i'TALIS.no
DEVELOPMENT (1942).
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activities of the Progressive Party during the election campaign of 1948, and he
resisted all questions regarding a lecture that he delivered during 1954, at the
invitation of the faculty for humanities, on the University of New Hampshire campus.
Regarding the second category, he refused to answer these specific questions:19
i. "What was the subject of your lecture?"
2. "Didn't you tell the class at the University of New Hampshire on Monday,
March 22, 1954, that socialism was inevitable in this country?"
3- "Did you advocate Marxism at that time?"
4. "Did you express the opinion, or did you make the statement at that time
that socialism was inevitable in America?"
5. "Did you in this last lecture on March 22 or in any of the former lectures
espouse the theory of dialectical materialism?"
The lower court found Sweezy in contempt for his failures to answer, and
this judgment was affirmed by the state supreme court2
On appeal, the United States Supreme Court reversed, two Justices concurring
in a special opinion and two Justices dissenting. Consequently, there was no single
opinion for a majority of the Court.
Mr. Chief Justice Warren, joined by Justices Black, Douglas and Brennan, wrote
an opinion which commented upon the vagueness of the New Hampshire law and
which noted the ease whereby legislative investigations conducted under this statute
could trespass upon first amendment rights. These four Justices concluded that
Sweezy's academic freedom "to lecture and his right to associate with others were
constitutionally protected freedoms which had been abridged through this investi-
gation."21  The opinion continued:
22
These are rights which are safeguarded by the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. We believe that there unquestionably was an invasion of petitioner's liberties in
the areas of academic freedom and political expression-areas in which government should
be extremely reticent to tread.
Although this invasion of constitutionally protected freedoms existed, and although
these four justices could not "conceive of any circumstance wherein a state interest
would justify [an] infringement of rights in these fields," 3 they did not believe that
they had to "reach such fundamental questions of state power to decide this case."2' 4
For them, there was a missing link; hence, they put their decision on different
grounds. Neither the "expansive definitions" of the statutes,2 5 nor the facts found
in the record, revealed "what reasonable or reliable information led the Attorney
" See Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 243-44 (1956).
"Wyman v. Sweezy, xoo N.H. 103, 121 A.2d 783 (z956).
21 Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 249-50 (1956).
"Id. at 250.
"Id. at 251.
24 Ibid.
"See note 15 sqpra.
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General to question the petitioner."" Thus, the needed nexus was missing which,
if present, would have connected the attorney general's questioning of Sweezy with
the fundamental interest of the state to protect itself from overthrow by force and
violence. In short, these justices could not determine whether the New Hampshire
legislature really wanted the information sought from Sweezy. Consequently, "the
use of the contempt power, notwithstanding the interference with constitutional
rights, was not in accordance with the due process requirements of the Fourteenth
Amendment."2
In a concurring opinion, Mr. Justice Frankfurter, joined by Justice Harlan,
criticized the Chief Justice for his view that the conviction was invalid due to a
missing link. For them, there was no missing link; "the case must be judged as
though the whole body of the legislature had demanded the information."2 There-
fore, they had to reach fundamental questions of state power under the first
and fourteenth amendments.
In deciding the issue, Justice Frankfurter balanced contending principles. Sweezy
had put forth the rights of a guest lecturer to academic freedom, as well as the right
of a citizen to political privacy. For New Hampshire there was the right of the
state to protect itself from overthrow by force and violence. Justice Frankfurter
concluded that, on balance, Sweezy had to prevail, primarily because there was no
basis for the belief that Sweezy's past activities reasonably constituted a subversive
threat, justifying the questioning. "When weighed against the grave harm resulting
from governmental intrusion into the intellectual life of a university, such justifica-
tion for compelling a witness to discuss the contents of his lecture appears grossly
inadequate."29 Thus, the claim of academic freedom was given protection and held
to come within the ambit of the first and fourteenth amendments30
In a dissenting opinion, Mr. Justice Clark, joined by Justice Burton, struck a
balance contrary to that found by Justices Frankfurter and Harlan. The dissenting
56 Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 252 (1956).
I7 1d. at 254-55.
I ld. at 256. For further criticism, see, Crampton, The Supreme Court and State Power to Deal twith
Subversion and Loyalty, 43 MINN. L. REv. 1026, 1048 (1959).
"' Id. at 261. "If ... Sweezy decided anything, [it] decided that before inroads in the First Amend.
ment domain may be made, some demonstrable connection with communism must first be established
and the matter be plainly shown to be within the scope of the Committee's authority." Douglas, J., in
Braden v. United States, 365 U.S. 431, 456-57 (196o) (dissent).
" The reasoning follows: "Progress in the natural sciences is not remotely confined to findings made
in the laboratory. Insights into the mysteries of nature are born of hypothesis and speculation. The more
so is this true in the pursuit of understanding in the groping endeavors of what are called the social
sciences, the concern of which is man and society. The problems that are the respective preoccupations
of anthropology, economics, law, psychology, sociology and related areas of scholarship are merely depart-
mentalized dealing, by way of manageable division of analysis, with interpenetrating aspects of holistic
perplexities. For society's good-if understanding be an essential need of society-inquiries into these
problems, speculations about them, stimulation in others of reflection upon them, must be left as un-
fettered as possible. Political power must abstain from intrusion into this activity of freedom, pursued
in the interest of wise government and the people's well-being, except for reasons that are exigent and
obviously compelling." Id. at 261-62.
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Justices held that New Hampshire's interest in self-preservation justified the in-
trusion into Sweezy's civil liberties3 1
The plurality and concurring opinions in the Sweezy case clearly recognize that
academic freedom will be given protection under the first and fourteenth amend-
ments; however, it must be academic freedom that is claimed. Nothing in the
Sweezy case says that all investigatory power is denied solely because the field of
education is involved 3 2 The Court will examine carefully the claim of academic
freedom to be sure that it is well taken.
It would appear that subsequent events have confirmed this view; for example,
consider Barenblatt v. United States3 3 Its situation was this: Lloyd Barenblatt, a
teacher of psychology at Vassar College, was summoned to appear before a Subcom-
mittee of the House Committee on Un-American Activities. But before he actually
appeared his contract had expired, and it was not renewed. "He, therefore, came
to the Committee as a private citizen without a job." 4 Barenblatt was convicted for
refusing to answer whether he was then, or ever had been, a member of the Com-
munist Party, or whether he had been "a member of the Haldane Club of the
Communist Party while at the University of Michigan." 5 It should be noted that
these questions do not strike directly at academic freedom in the same manner as
those put to Paul Sweezy. On appeal, the Court viewed "the ultimate issue in this
case to be whether petitioner could properly be convicted of contempt for refusing
to answer questions relating to his participation in or knowledge of alleged Com-
munist Party activities at educational institutions in this country."3 It is clear that
this issue is not one of due process, but one involving the first amendment, and hence,
similar to the issue considered under Mr. Justice Frankfurter's approach in Sweezy.
The Court affirmed Barenblatt's conviction despite his reliance on Sweezy and
other first amendment cases. For the majority, this reliance was misplaced. In
his opinion for the Court, Mr. Justice Harlan carefully distinguished the Barenblatt
case from the Sweezy case,3" referring, inter alia, to note 2o. This note shows
Id. at 270.
"See Wilkinson v. United States, 365 U.S. 399, 4o9 (i96o).
"36o U.S. 3o 0959). I do not deal with Uphaus v. Wyman, 36o U.S. 72 ('959), even though
it has important overtones for Sweezy. The reasons are that Uphau did not involve any claim of
academic freedom, turning, as it did, solely upon Uphaus' interest in associational privacy and that
the Court held Sweezy not to be in point. But compare, Gibson v. Florida, 372 U.S. 539 (1963).
"Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. zo9, 134 (i959) (dissenting opinion).
"Id. at 114.
"Id. at X15.
"Id. at 329. "The vice existing there was that the questioning of Sweezy, who had not been shown
ever to have been connected with the Communist Party, as to the contents of a lecture he had given
at the University of New Hampshire, and as to his connections with the Progressive Party, then on the
ballot as a normal political party in some 26 States, was too far removed from the premises on which
the constitutionality of the State's investigation had to depend to withstand attack under the Fourteenth
Amendment. See the concurring opinion in Sweezy, supra, at 261, 265, 266 n.3. This is a very
different thing from inquiring into the extent to which the Communist Party has succeeded in infiltrating
into our universities, or elsewhere, persons and groups committed to furthering the objective of overthrow.
See Note 20, supra."
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that the investigation in Barenblatt was carefully limited in its scope to communism,
and did not aim at academic freedom. It appears that Representative Jackson, a
member of the Un-American Activities Committee, had informed the House of
Representatives about this particular investigation saying:"8
I want to point out this is not a blunderbuss approach to the problem of communism in
education. We are not interested in textbooks. We are not interested in the classroom
operations of the universities. We are interested instead in finding out who the com-
munists are and what they are doing to further the communist conspiracy.
Given the fact that Barenblatt was not questioned about any of his academic activities
when he functioned as a professor,"9 and the fact that the investigation was not aimed
at academic freedom, the Court felt that Barenblatt's case differed substantially from
Sweezy's. This view necessarily implies that the majority of the Court in Barenblatt
construed, and approved, the holding of the Sweezy case in light of its concurring,
and not plurality, opinion. That view now commands a majority. Otherwise, the
Sweezy case, as holding, would not have been relevant to the issue in Barenblatt.4 °
Consequently, it can be said that, today, Sweezy stands unshaken in this respect:
academic freedom has been recognized as properly receiving constitutional pro-
tection under the first and fourteenth amendments.
One final case, decided after Sweezy and Barenblatt, fully corroborates this view:
Shelton v. Tucker 1 It does not set matters at rest, but it does have significant im-
plications for several of the four essentials of academic freedom-the right to deter-
mine on academic grounds who may teach and under what conditions. An Arkansas
-statute aimed at the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People
(NAACP) but struck academic freedom. It required that every teacher, as a condi-
;tion of employment, execute an affidavit disclosing every organization with which
he had been associated over a five-year period.42 Shelton had been a public
school teacher for twenty-five years, and he refused to comply. He was notified
that his teaching contract would not be renewed, and Arkansas provided nothing
comparable to a system of tenure to fall back upon. Thereupon, he brought a class
action to enjoin the Arkansas statute on the ground that it deprived "teachers in
Arkansas of their rights to personal, associational, and academic liberty, protected
by the Due Process clause of the fourteenth amendment from invasion by state
action."4  The Supreme Court upheld Shelton's claim. First of all, the Court
'
8 1d. at 122 n.2o.
The only question relating to Barenblatt's academic activity dealt with his relationship, as a student,
with the Haldane Club of the Communist Party.
,' Indeed, Sweezy's concurring opinion, adjudicating the issue on the first and fourteenth amendments,
is the only one considered by the Court in Barenblatt. See note 37 supra, and also see Shelton v.
Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 487 (i96o), and Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 514 (396o) (dissent).41364 U.S. 479 (ig6o).
4 
2 1d. at 480 n.2.
8 1d. at 484-85.
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admitted that there could be no question of the relevance of the state's inquiry into
the fitness and competence of its teachers. Nevertheless, even though this statute's
inquiry was relevant, that alone did not make it constitutional. To the contrary, this
inquiry was so unlimited and indiscriminate that it constituted a prior restraint on
the exercise of constitutionally guaranteed first amendment freedoms, incorporated
into the fourteenth. Thus, the Court struck down the Arkansas statute because, as
a condition of employment, it went "far beyond what might be justified in the
exercise of the State's legitimate inquiry into the fitness and competency of its
teachers." '44 It is relevant to note that the Court's opinion relied upon Sweezy45
in the academic freedom context of Shelton v. Tucker and ignored Barenblatt.
Before the Sweezy case was decided, and without formally recognizing the claim
of academic freedom, the Supreme Court actually protected it on several occasions.
In Meyer v. Nebraska4 the Court held that a state statute prohibiting the teaching
of languages, other than English, in grades one through eight unreasonably in-
fringed upon the liberty guaranteed a teacher by the fourteenth amendment.
The Court held that the legislature had "attempted materially to interfere with the
calling of modern language teachers, with the opportunities of pupils to acquire
knowledge, and with the power of parents to control the education of their own."'
Even though the Court approached the issues obliquely and inconclusively, this
case did give protection to two of the "four essential freedoms" of academic liberty;
namely, the rights to determine on academic grounds what may be taught and
who may be admitted to study. When Meyer is combined with Shelton and
Sweezy, it can be seen that, in one way or another, the Court has provided at least
partial constitutional recognition for three of the four essential freedoms of academic
liberty. On the other hand, some state courts have failed to follow the lead of
the United States Supreme Court and have not, as yet, given the claim of academic
freedom its due measure of recognition.48
"Id. at 490.
'Id. at 487.
"262 U.S. 390 (1923). See Notes, x2 CAxi. L. REv. 136 (1924); 22 Mcst. L. REV. 248 (X924),
and 72 U. PA. L. REV 46 (x923); also see, Bartels v. Iowa, 262 U.S. 404 (1923); Pierce v. Society of
Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925), and Note, School Boards, Schoolbooks, and the Freedom to Learn, 59
YALE L.J. 928 (195o).
' 
7 d. at 401. Also note Farrington v. Tokushige, 273 U.S. 284 (1927), which holds unconstitutional
an act regulating the teaching of foreign languages because its regulations imposed unreasonable require-
ments upon schools taught in a foreign language. Note also Mo Hock Ke Lok Po v. Stainback, 74 F.
Supp. 852 (D. Haw., 1947), rev'd on other grounds, 336 U.S. 368 (1949).
48 See McDowell v. Board of Education, 104 Misc. 564, X72 N.Y. Supp. 590 (x918) (dismissal of
school teacher because of pacifist beliefs during wartime); also see State v. Turner, 19 So.2d 832 (Fla.
1944); Reed v. Orleans Parish School Board, 21 So.2d 895 (La. App. 1945) (dismissal for failure to
participate in war work activities); Horosko v. School Dist., 335 Pa. 369, 6 A.2d 866 (1939) (dismissal
for working in a tavern); Board of Education v. Jewett, 21 Cal. App.2d 64, 68 P.2d 404 (1937) (dis-
missal for classroom praise of Soviet Union and criticism of United States); Joyce v. Board of Education,
325 II1. App. 543, 6o N.E.2d 431 (945) (dismissal for writing a later published letter which encouraged
a former student in his failure to register for the draft). Also see Worzella v. Board of Regents, 93
N.W.2d 411 (S.D. 1958) (tenure plan violates state constitution), discussed in Byse, Academic Freedom,
Tenure and the Law, 73 HAv. L. REV. 304 (959).
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II
LOYALTY OATHS AND SECURITY PROGRAMS
Few Americans are fully aware of an amazing network which, with an alarming
vitality, has spread throughout American society 9 Loyalty-security programs have
proliferated to all levels, and programs are currently being administered by federal,"0
state, 51 local52 and private agencies. These programs are all recent newcomers
to our social scene. 4 Loyalty-security measures have multiplied with startling rapid-
ity and can be found almost everywhere.55 The most exhaustive study of one aspect
of the total problem-loyalty tests as a condition of employment-declares that "the
record of the last decade, however, suggests strongly that the hardest thing to do
with loyalty programs is to confine them."" The official programs date only from
President Truman's 1947 loyalty order for federal employees; and, if legislative in-
vestigations are discounted, that event marks the beginning of recent large-scale
attempts to measure a man's loyalty as a condition of his employment.5 7
The total overall impact of loyalty-security programs on our free institutions has
yet to be measured, but it must be staggering. It will suffice to consider the implica-
tions of one example, confined solely to loyalty as a test of employment. As of 1958,
reliable, and cautious, estimates revealed that a few more than i,6ooooo professional
people (scientists, teachers, lawyers, engineers, and so on) had occupations dependent
upon their ability to meet some type of loyalty criteria. Add to these the over
7-2 million people in federal, state, and local government, plus the astonishing
"' Not counting legislative investigations, it appears that loyalty tests have been prescribed as condi-
tions of employment by the federal government for federal civil servants, government contractors and
their employees, the Atomic Energy Commission, the Defense Department, certain other military per-
sonnel, labor leaders, unclassified researchers, and licensed seamen. States have prescribed loyalty tests for
teachers, lawyers, doctors, clergymen, social workers, librarians, veterinarians, state and local civil servants,
and so on. See RALPH S. BROWN, LoYALTY AND SECURITY, 21-119, x64-83 (1958).
S see E. BoNTEcou, THE FEDERAL LOYALTY SECURITY PROGRAM (1953); also see A. YARMOLINSKV
(ED.), CASE STUDIES IN PERSONNEL SECURITY (1955).
" See WALTER GELLHORN (ED.), THE STATES AND SUBVERSION (1952); FUND FOR THE REPUBLIC,
DIGEST OP THE PUBLIC RECORD OF COMMUNISM IN THE UNITED STATES, PART II, STATE STATUTES AND
DECISIONS (1955), and Prendergast, State Legislatures and Communism, 44 AM. POL. Sct. REv. 556
(1950).
"E.g., see Garner v. Board of Pub. Wks., 341 U.S. 7x6 (195i).
"See INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS RESEARCH ASSOCIATION, PERSONNEL SECURITY PROGRAMS IN U.S. INDUSTRY
(1955); Comment, The Role of Employer Practices in the Federal Industrial Personnel Security Program, 8
STAN. L. REV. 234 (1956), and Comment, Loyalty and Private Employment, 62 YALE LJ. 954 (1953)-
" E.g., employment tests are very little discussed in the standard historical works; but see HAROLD M.
HYA.N, To TRY MEN'S SOULS-LoYALTY Tsrs IN AMERICAN HISTORY (1959); HAROLD M. HYMAN, ERA
OF THE OATH: NORTHERN LOYALTY TESTS DURING THE CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION (1954), and JoiN
C. MILLER, CRISIS IN FREEDOM: THE ALIEN AND SEDITION ACTS (95).
" E.g., the Indiana Athletic Commission is reported to have a requirement that, before they are-
allowed to perform, boxers and wrestlers must subscribe to a loyalty oath. RALPH S. BROWN, LOYALTY AND
SECURITY II8 (1958), and Walter Gellhorn, in his useful book, INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM AND GOVERNMENTAL
RESTRAINTS I29-30 (1956) reports that Washington requires a loyalty oath of its veterinarians.
" BROWN, op. cit. supra note 55, at 338.
5 Exec. Order No. 9835, 12 Fed. Reg. 1935 (1947), superseded by Exec. Order No. x0450, 18 Fed,
Reg. 2489 (i953). For commentary, see Emerson & Helfeld, Loyalty Among Government Employees, 5&;
YALE LJ. 14 (1948).
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figure of over 4-!/z million people who must meet industrial security tests, and these
figures total over I3-!/2 million. Applied to a work force of 65 million, this estimate
"means that at least one person out of five, as a condition of his current employment,
has taken a test oath, or completed a loyalty statement, or achieved official security
clearance or survived some undefined private scrutiny.""8  More importantly, it
appears that about i1,500 people, the largest single group involved in federal
contracts in private employment, for one reason or another, have failed their loyalty
tests. Hence, loyality qualifications appear to have barred from employment one
person in every 2,5 00 9 When applied to teachers and limited to state and municipal
governments, it is estimated that approximately 500 teachers (school and college)
were dismissed between 1948 and 1958, mostly for refusals to answer questions or
to take loyalty oaths as conditions of employment."0 The proliferation of loyalty-
security measures, and their impact on dissent, leads one seriously to consider whether
America is approaching an era of orthodoxy. Perhaps so, but colleges and universities
are certainly the last places where such policies should be promoted; however, recent
events reveal ominous signs.
It appears that, as of late, the pressures on our universities and colleges have
been intensifying, producing new forces for orthodoxy and a spate of attacks on
academic freedom. 1 The American Association of University Professors (AAUP),
during 1945 to 195o, had before it for consideration 227 cases involving academic
freedom, not counting many "situations" which are not classified as cases.68 During
the decade of the fifties, legislative investigations heavily taxed academic freedom,
frequently precipitating dismissals from university faculties or non-renewals of term
appointments that otherwise would have been granted.6 3 Nineteen cases have been
BROWN, op. ct. supra note 55, at xi.
0 51d. at 182.
'
01 d. at 488 (Appendix A).
O See, e.g., The Lines of Attack on Academic Freedom, Part III, of R. M. MAcIvRn, ACADEMIC
FREEDOM IN OUR TIME 123-205 (1955); All. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, GREATER PMLADELPHIA BRANCH,
ACADEMIC FREEDOM: SOME RECENT PHILADELPHIA EPISODES (1954), and Note, 42 A.A.U.P. BULL. 75
(956).
02 Report of Committee T, 37 A.A.U.P. BULL. 79 (1951). For full discussion of the attacks and their
aftermath, at the University of Washington, see RALPH S. BROWN, LOYALTY AND SECURITY 120-22 (958),
VERN COUNTRYMAN, UN-AMERICAN ACTIVITIES IN THE STATE OF WASHINGTON (i951) and BOAtD OF
REGENTS, UNIVERSITY OF WASHINGTON, COMMUNISM AND ACADEMIC FREEDOM (1949). For the California
situation, see GEORGE R. STEWART, THE YEAR OF THE OATH (1950); Tolman v. Underhill, 229 P.ad
447 (Cal. App. 195), and KANToROWITZ, THE FUNDAMENTAL ISSUE, DOCUMENTS AND MARGINAL NOTES
ON THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA LOYALTY OATH (950), and note generally, JOHN W. CAUGHEY,
IN CLEAR AND PRESENT DANGER (1958). These materials do not speak fully to the intimidations which
were generated.
"I See chapter 2 of PAUL F. LAZARSFELD & WAGNER THIELENS, THE ACADEMIC MIND (1958). As the
case of Professor Rupert C. Koeninger demonstrates, the technique of failing to recommend reappointment
is not confined to the younger faculty members. It appears that, because of certain political activities, and
after fourteen years of service to Sam Houston State Teachers College, Professor Koeninger's name, on
May 4-6, 1961, was not among those recommended for reappointment to the institution. The political
activities charged to Professor Koeninger seem to have consisted of (i) delivering a keynote address on
"The First Year of Integration" before a meeting of the Southern Conference Educational Fund; (2)
helping to set up booths to collect money for the payment of poll taxes; (3) signing a petition, using the
title "professor" which endorsed a candidate for judicial office; (4) questioning a congressman, at an open
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reported, and they usually have involved a faculty member who refused to answer
a question, thereby stimulating the employing institution to undertake action that
ultimately led to his dismissal. 4 In some of the cases, it is true, the faculty members,
as well as the administrations,6 5 were at fault; nevertheless, this fact does not decrease
the impact of the investigations on the "spirit of freedom" so essential to an academic
community. In addition, there were fourteen dismissals from New York City
municipal colleges66 under a law which later was found to be unconstitutional."1
Furthermore, R. E. Combs, counsel to the California Senate Committee on Un-
American Activities, has testified that a number of college and university presidents
in California have arranged for "clearance" from the state committee of all new
appointees to their faculties, and privately to receive "derogatory information"
regarding their present staffs.6"
The loyalty oath, in addition to legislative investigations, is another device which
directly attacks free inquiry and expression. It is the predominant loyalty-security
device used by state and local governments as a condition of employment60 Oaths
are basically of two types: the positive pledge and the negative disclaimer. Today,
meeting, about his reasons for voting to uphold a presidential veto of a bill; (5) engaging in "a political
hassle" with a student, and (6) disputing the veracity of the film "Operation Abolition" three weeks
prior to the board meeting at which he was not rehired. For more discussion see 49 A.A.U.P. BULL.
44 (1963). Among other things, Professors Koeninger's situation illustrates the need for a functioning
system of tenure. See CLARi BYsE & Louis JOUGHIN, TENURE IN AmERICAN HIOHER EDUCATION (X959),
and Byse, Academic Freedom, Tenure, and the Law, 73 HARv. L. REV. 304 (1959).
"' See Brief of Amicus Curiae (AAUP), in Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. xo9 ('959) at p. 16
where the following chart appears:
Reference to
Number of Group Putting AAUP Bulletin
Name of Institution Dismissals the Question Vol. Page
Dickinson College I HCUA 44 : 137
New York University I ISC 44 : 22
1 HCUA
Ohio State University I HCUA 42 : 81
Reed College I HCUA 44 : 102
Rutgers University 2 ISC
I HCUA 42 : 77
Temple University I HCUA 42 : 79
University of Kansas City 3 ISC 43 : 177
University of Michigan a HCUA 44 : 53
University of Southern California I HCUA 44 : 151
University of Vermont I ISC 44 : 11
University of Washington 3 State Legislature 42 : 6z
Wayne University 2 HCUA 42 : 87
'5 For expression of concern that university administrators are doing less than they ought, see PAUL
GooDmAN, THE COMMUNITY OF SCHOLARS (1962).
"See 42 A.A.U.P. BULL. 71 (1956). See, e.g., Daniman v. Board of Education, 3o6 N.Y. 532, 119N.E.2'd 373 (19.54)-
" Slochower v. Board of Higher Education, 350 U.S. 551 (1955).
"Hearings Before the Subcomm. to Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act of the
Sen. Comm. on the Judiciary, Subversive Influence in the Educational Process, 83d Cong., ist Sess. 6o5-22
(1953); and see Gerstel, G-Men on the Campus, The Nation, Jan. 30, 1954, p. 93.
"RALPH S. BROWN, LOYALTY AND SECURITY 92 (1958); WALTER GELLHORx (ED.), THE STATES
AND SUBVERSION (1952); and E. EDMUND REUTER, THE SCHOOL ADMINISTRATOR AND SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES
(1951).
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at least twenty-six states impose a disclaimer-type test oath on all their employees,
including teachers.70 They demand a negation of certain activities. The disclaimers
require that the employee, in sweeping terms, swear that he is not subversive and
that he will not be subversive, and, in some cases, that he has never been sub-
versive.7'
On the other hand, oaths requiring a pledge refer to positive, rather than negative
actions. Generally, they have been prescribed exclusively for teachers, as dis-
tinguished from all other state employees. The one required by the state of Wash-
ington is an example, and it applies to all teachers, including university faculty:72
" They are Alaska, Arkansas, California, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Kansas, Louisiana,
Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Mississippi, Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Jersey, Ohio,
Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Texas, Washington, and West Virginia. See, BROwNr, Op.
cit. supra note 69, at 92 n.2.
5 5 The one for the state of Washington is an example; it requires the following:
"I certify that I have read the provisions of § 9.8i.oxo (2), (3), and (5), § 9.81.o6o,
§ 9.8I.07o, and § 9.81.083 of the Washington Revised Code, which are printed on the reverse
hereof, that I understand and am familiar with the contents thereof; that I am not a subversive
person as therein defined; and
"I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I am not a member of the Communist Party or know-
ingly of any other subversive organization.
"I understand that this statement and oath are made subject to the penalties of perjury."
"Public Employment-Subversive Person Ineligible.-No subversive person, as defined in this act, shall
be eligible for employment in, or appointment to any office, or any position of trust or profit in the
government, or in the administration of the business, of this state, or of any county, municipality, or other
political subdivision of this state." WASH. Rav. CODE § 9.8i.o6o (Supp. 1956).
"Definitions.-(5) 'Subversive person' means any person who commits, attempts to commit, or aids in
the commission, or advocates, abets, advises or teaches by any means any person to commit, attempt to
commit, or aid in the commission of any act intended to overthrow, destroy or alter, or to assist in the
overthrow, destruction or alteration of, the constitutional form of the government of the United States,
or of the state of Washington, or any political subdivision of either of them by revolution, force, or
violence; or who with knowledge that the organization is an organization as described in subsections (2)
and (3) hereof, becomes or remains a member of a subversive organization or a foreign subversive
organization." WAsH. REv. ConE § 9.8i.oio(5).
"(2) 'Subversive organization' means any organization which engages in or advocates, abets, advises,
or teaches, or a purpose of which is to engage in or advocate, abet, advise, or teach activities intended
to overthrow, destroy, or alter, or to assist in the overthrow, destruction or alteration of, the constitutional
form of the government of the United States, or of the state of Washington, or of any political subdivision
of either of them, by revolution, force or violence." WASH. REv. CODE § 9.81.010(2).
"(3) 'Foreign subversive organization' means any organization directed, dominated or controlled directly
or indirectly by a foreign government which engages in or advocates, abets, advises, or teaches, or a
purpose of which is to engage in or to advocate, abet, advise, or teach, activities intended to overthrow,
destroy or alter, or to assist in the overthrow, destruction or alteration of the constitutional form of the
government of the United States, or of the state of Washington, or of any political subdivision of either
of them, and to establish in place thereof any form of government the direction and control of which
is to be vested in or exercised by or under, the domination or control of any foreign government, organiza-
tion, or individual." WASH. REv. CODE § 9.81.00(3). See Baggett v. Bullitt, 215 F. Supp. 439 (W.D.
Wash. 1963).
I"WAsH. REv. CODE § 28.70.150 and § 28.76.230 (Supp. 1956). The specific problems of academic
freedom raised by these oaths will not be separately treated in this article, but the general problems tend
to be the same as those raised by disclaimer oaths. For further discussion of this type oath, see HENRY R.
LmNvILLE, OATS o' LOYALTY FOR TEACHEES (935), and Gardner & Post, The Constitutional Questions
Raised by the Flag Salute and Teacher's Oath Act in Massachusetts, 16 B.U.L. REV. 803 (1936). It appears
that the following states, in addition to Washington, require this type of oath from their teachers: Colorado,
Indiana, Michigan, Nevada, New York, North Dakota and Vermont require these types of oaths as a condi-
tion of employment. See FUND FOR THE REPUBLiC, INC., DIGEST OF THE PUBLic REcoRD OF COMMeUNISMe IN
THE UNITED STATES, P. H, § M (1955).
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I solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support the constitution and laws of the
United States of America and the State of Washington, and will by precept and example
promote respect for the flag and the institutions of the United States of America and the
State of Washington, reverence for law and order and undivided allegiance to the
government of the United States.
The legal sanctions behind oaths are two, one immediate and the other mediate.
Failure to subscribe to the required oath generally means that an application for
employment will automatically be denied or that a faculty member will lose his
employment. The second sanction is the possibility of criminal prosecution and,
perhaps, conviction for perjury. This second sanction, while less certain, is more
severe. But given the continuing tensions of the cold war and the rise of the
American radical right, 3 with its emphasis on the educational system, it appears
probable that there are now juries much more disposed to convict for false swearing
than there once were 4 In addition, it now appears likely that voices will be raised
which may insist that universities and/or state legislatures create and supervise a
pattern of continuing investigation like that currently practiced by the federal govern-
ment regarding its employees. The goal would be that of ferreting out false signers.
These recent developments will not, of course, serve to deter ambitious prosecutors,
nor will the "expansive statutory definitions" of subversiveness. It appears that
prospects of a possible conviction may have been in mind, when some witnesses, who
in the early 1940's clearly denied communist affiliations, found it wise, in response
to similar questions to plead their privilege against self-incrimination during the
i95o's35 Even though a conviction might be uncertain, the mere hint of a threat
of criminal prosecution is a sobering device and frequently enough to bring most
academic people into line. Reputation, financial standing, advanced academic oppor-
tunities and social position are all at stake if a prosecution for falsely swearing to
one's loyalty is started, regardless of its outcome ° As the Supreme Court has
observed, "people do not lightly disregard public officers' thinly veiled threats to in-
stitute criminal proceedings against them if they do not come around.177
The potentialities described above are hardly conducive to promoting that
"sense of freedom" necessary for free and creative thought which, by definition, must
challenge all existing orthodoxy. In such a situation the real result is, of course,
"See D. BELL (ED.), THE RADICAL RIrr (z963); MARK SHERWIN, TmE ExrRMISrs (1963); R.
ELLSWORTH & S. HARRIS, THE AMEaJCAN RIGHT WING (1962); 1. SUmuL, THE AMERICAN ULTRAs (1962);
G. GoULD, INSIDE THE BIRCH SOClETY (1961); FIRST NATIoNAL DIRECTORY OF RIGHnsT GRoups (196,2).
74 Consider, for example, Professor Koeninger's case, supra note 63, and Board of Education v.
Jewett, 21 Cal. App.2d 64, 68 P.2d 404 (1937) (classroom statements made by a teacher held to violate
oath and constitute grounds for dismissal).
7r Hearings Before the Subcomm. to Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act of the
Sen. Comm. on the judiciary, Subversive Influence in the Educational Process, 83d Cong., Ist Sess. 553.54
('953).
"' Alexander Hamilton saw this point clearly when he said that "a power over a man's subsistence
amounts to a power over his will." THE FEDERALIST No. 79, at 491 (Gideon ed. i8x8) (Hamilton). For
discussion of the academic employment difliculties of "security risks," see chapter 7 of WALTER GELLHORN,
LOYALTY AND SCIENCE 175-202 (1950).
"'Bantam Books Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58 (1963).
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an impairment of academic freedom. The sweep of recent events not only has a clear
and distinct message for present faculty members but also for our youth who plan
to seek out teaching positions. 3  They must be fearful that they do not commit
youthful indiscretions, or become involved in mistaken or misguided enthusiasms
that later might rise from their pasts, like ghosts, to haunt their careers. They must
not deviate; and hence, they must play it safe. Fearing later condemnation, they
probably will shrink from associations, and therefore from speech and thought, that
might stir controversy 9 On the other hand, if they do become entangled with a
cause to the left of center, then their fears will be similar to those already present in
many of today's faculty members. They will fear a continuing surveillance of their
activities, or a combing of their pasts, or a cocking of ears, including those of their
students, to catch all their words to sift them for clues of dangerous thoughts and
badges of disloyalty. In short, loyalty oaths and their enforcement procedures cast
a pall of orthodoxy over the classroom. There can be no academic freedom in such
a situation s° "Where suspicion fills the air and holds scholars in line for fear of
"' Nor does it seem that college presidents are immune. Consider the case of Charles H. Fisher, Presi-
dent of Western Washington College of Education, who was dismissed after sixteen years of service. It
appears that a committee of five citizens, including the local Grand Dragon of the Ku-Klux-Klan, sub-
mitted to the Board of Trustees ten charges against President Fisher which, having a modern ring,
indicated that Fisher had allowed "numerous executives and members of subversive organizations, and
of free love, atheistic and un-American pacifist organizations" to address the student body "while pro-
Americans have not appeared," and that he engaged in a "studied avoidance of having Christian leaders
address the student body . . . while some lecturers who have appeared have spoken flippantly of
Christianity and have condemned the American economic life." "The flag is seldom displayed on
campus," and the student newspaper rebuked the local papers that warned the public against subversive
activities. The Board of Trustees specifically dealt with each charge separately, and finally concluded by
endorsing President Fisher. However, three years later he was dismissed by the same trustees without
any additional reasons being given. It should be noted that immediately after the trustees' first decision,
the chairman of the citizens' group appealed to Governor Martin who conferred with the Board before
its second decision. Reported in 27 AAUP BULLETiN 48 (1941).
To John Stuart Mill's classic point applies here:
"[T]he peculiar evil of silencing the expression of an opinion is that it is robbing the human race;
posterity as well as the existing generation; those who dissent from the opinion, still more than those
who hold it. If the opinion is right, they are deprived of the opportunity of exchanging error for
truth: if wrong, they lose, what is almost as great a benefit, the clearer perception and livelier impression
of truth, produced by its collision with error." JoHN SruAr MILL, ON LIBERTY i6 (Crofts Classics ed.
1947).
"8 Consider the remarks of PAuL F. LAzA.RsFsLn & WAGNER THIIELENS, THE AcADEMIc MINID l1
(958):
"Men and women who opposed Communism may find it quite degrading if they feel forced to
reiterate their private convictions in order to satisfy suspicious critics. While they agree with the
condemnation of Communism, they fear they may be setting a dangerous precedent on the broader
issue of free expression of opinions. If forswearing heresy becomes general practice, they may
someday find themselves in a precarious position if they should deviate from the prevailing mood
of the time. As a result, professors often feel embarrassment and even guilt. They are not
extremists, but they dislike having to prove it."
In the years following World War II, when intellectual liberty has been so much under attack, this
study by Lazarsfeld and Thielens shows that: (a) 46% of the teachers covered by their study felt
"apprehensive" about their freedom to teach and speak freely (id. at 84-85). But, significantly, a higher
percentage, 54%, of those without tenure felt the apprehension (id. at 240); (b) this "apprehension" put
"a noticeable damper on the activities and opinions" of these teachers (id. at 192); (c) some teachers toned
down their writings and did not fully express their full convictions and thought in their writings and
avoided assigning "controversial" reference works for discussion (id. at 197); (d) some teachers avoided
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their jobs, there can be no exercise of the free intellect.""1 Fear replaces the pursuit
of knowledge with deadening doctrines; discussion ends where it should begin, and
"supineness and dogmatism take the place of free inquiry."82
III
ACADEMIC FREEDOM, LOYALTY OATHS, AND THE CONSTITUT[ON
There is an inevitable clash between loyalty oaths, as state-prescribed conditions
for university employment, and academic freedom which, ultimately, must be
governed by the Constitution. To date, the United States Supreme Court has not
fully explored any case which has unequivocally pitted the first amendment claim
of a faculty member to free speech, including academic freedom, against a state
requirement that, as a condition of employment, a professor must subscribe to a
loyalty oath. It should be recalled that recognition of the fact that academic freedom
will be given first amendment protection is of comparatively recent date, coming
in the Sweezy case, supra. Since that case, the Court has written opinions in only
two loyalty oath cases, neither of them involving a claim to academic freedom."8
Thus, it can be seen that critical investigations must be undertaken and that the
relevant constitutional doctrines remain to be formulated and are still in the process
of being settled. Even so, the doctrines will, in part, be forged from the precedents.
Before turning to the relevant cases,84 one shibboleth ought to be buried for all
time. It is the assertion that a public employee has no standing to complain about
a loyalty oath, as a condition of employment, for the reason that his public employ-
ment is a privilege and not a right. If this "privilege vs. right" fallacy were carried
to its logical conclusion, it would disallow all applications of the fourteenth amend-
ment to test the qonditions of state employment, thereby nullifying that amendment
in this area. States would be free to condition their employment on such constitu-
tionally forbidden criteria as race, religion, or politics because, after all, none would be
denied any rights if public employment were simply a privilege8 5
Is public employment merely a "privilege" such that it can arbitrarily be denied,
and need not public officials present a rational basis for such denials? The answer
controversial subjects in the classroom (id. at 197); (e) for some, their relationships with students were
substantially impaired (id. at 204 f). This state of affairs ought to be compared with Justice Frankfurter's
view that ". . . the liberty of man to search for truth ought not be fettered, no matter what orthodoxies
he may challenge." Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 550 (1950).
"
1 Per Douglas, J., in Adler v. Board of Education, 342 U.S. 485, 5xo (1951).
82 Ibid.
8 Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958), and Cramp v. Florida, 368 U.S. 278 (x962).
8 Although important to a legal analysis of loyalty oaths, but not directly to academic freedom, I will
not deal with the Bill of Attainder cases: Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. 227 (x866); Ex parte Garland,
71 U.S. 333 (1866); Pierce v. Carskadon, 83 U.S. 234 (x872), nor with American Communications Ass'n
v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950). These, and other cases, have recently been the subject of an excellent
discussion. See Comment, The Bounds of Legislative Specifications: A Suggested Approach to the Bill ol
Attainder Clause, 72 YALE L.J. 330 (1962).
"
5 Much confusion has resulted from a taking out of context of Mr. Justice Holmes' remarks in
McAuliffe v. City of New Bedford, 155 Mass. 216, 220, 29 N.E. 517 (1892), where he said, 'The peti-
tioner may have a constitutional right to talk politics, but he has no constitutional right to be a policeman."
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is clear. Although some lawyers, and courts,86 have refused to accept it, the Supreme
Court has set this issue at rest:
7
We need not pause to consider whether an abstract right to public employment exists.
It is sufficient to say that constitutional protection does extend to the public servant whose
exclusion pursuant to a statute is patently arbitrary or discriminatory.
This fundamental principle applies beyond public employment to public offices
for the Court has held that "the fact ... that a person is not compelled to hold
public office cannot possibly be an excuse for barring him from office by state-
imposed criteria forbidden by the Constitution.""8
Garner v. Board of Public Works"9 was the first case in which the Court wrote an
opinion on the constitutional status of state power to condition employment on
the execution of a modern disclaimer oath. California required that, as a condition
of employment, every employee must execute an affidavit stating whether or not
he was a member of the Communist Party, U.S.A., and, if so, must state the dates
of his membership. 0 In addition, each employee was required to take a disclaimer
oath.9 1 Fifteen civil service employees of the City of Los Angeles refused to subscribe
to the oath, and two others, who took the oath, refused to execute the affidavit.
They argued that these requirements violated their constitutional rights in that
they transgressed constitutional prohibitions against Bills of Attainder, ex post facto
laws, and state deprivations of speech and assembly. By votes of 7-to-2 on the
affidavit and 5-to-4 on the disclaimer oath, the Court upheld both measures over all
objections.
Relevant to a discussion of academic freedom9 2 is the fact that in his opinion for
the Court, Mr. Justice Clark did not, in any way, explore or discuss the constitutional
relationships between the oath or affidavit and the first and fourteenth amendments.
Instead, he described the situation presented by Garner in very restrictive terms,
characterizing the oath requirement as a provision reasonably designed to protect
the integrity and competency of the municipal civil service through reasonable
inquiry into the qualifications of persons to learn their fitness for employment.
Since the Court earlier had upheld a similar provision when applied to federal
civil servants," then, on precedent, "a State is not without power to do as much."
9 4
In addition to precedent, the Court reasoned by analogy from the fact that since
88 See, e.g., Gnecchi v. Washington, 58 Wash.ad 467, 364 P.2d 225 (1961).
8TWieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 192 (x952); see Slochower v. Board of Higher Education,
350 U.S. 551 (r956).
8 8Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 495-96 (1961); this view was recently confirmed in Cramp v.
Florida, 368 U.S. 278, 288 (1962).
so 34' U.S. 76 (1951). An earlier case, Gerende v. Board of Supervisors, 341 U.S. 56 (W95), was
disposed of per curiam and applied to political offices.
"The similarity of this question to that of the Barenblatt case is obvious.
" Its provisions were not as expansive as those appearing in note 71 supra, but somewhat similar.
"I do not discuss the Bill of Attainder or ex post facto points.
"United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1947).
" Garner v. Board of Public Works, 341 U.S. 76, 721 (195).
504 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS
private industry frequently inquired into loyalty, past conduct, and associational
relationships to determine fitness for private employment, such inquiry should be no
less relevant for public employment. This last point appears spurious to the extent
that public employment is, and private industry is not, bound by the fourteenth
amendment, but, as indicated above, the Court made no explorations of the limita-
tions of the first and fourteenth amendments in the Garner case. Thus, it can be
seen that the Court adjudicated only the interests of the state and the employee solely
with regard to the integrity of the civil service.
Garner certainly does not consider the interests of a state or those of a professor
in academic freedom on a university campus, and the case does not speak to this
set of relationships. That the interest of both a state and an employee in the
municipal civil service differs significantly from a state's interest in its faculty and
a professor's interest in employment at a university cannot be denied. Furthermore,
there is no precedent squarely speaking to this point; the issue of pitting claims of
constitutional protection for academic freedom against the claims of a state to
prescribe loyalty oaths as conditions of academic employment has not been fore-
closed by the Garner case. 5 Moreover, whatever interest a state may have which
justifies it in restricting the speech and associations of its civil servants as a condition
of their employment is, obviously, not of the same order as its interests regarding
the speech and associations of university faculty members.0 6 To the contrary, the
legitimate interest of a state in a free society, and the interest of a faculty member,
at a free university, are not in conflict, but in harmony; they join together to
further free speech and associations of faculty members and thereby to encourage
the pursuit of truth and knowledge for the entire community.
A case, decided before Sweezy, appears to contradict this view. Adler v. Board
of Education17 is not a loyalty oath case, but it is relevant because it asked the
Court to pass on the constitutionality of a scheme to counteract what was called
"subversive" influences in New York's public school system. Since 1940, the Civil
Service Law of New York has disallowed persons from teaching in any public
school if they were currently members of organizations that advocated the over-
throw of government by force and violence. In 1949, an amendment provided that,
after holding hearings, the Board of Regents was to prepare a list of banned organiza-
"
5 The Court has recognized this point in a subsequent case where it distinguished the Gerende and
Garner cases on the ground that in those cases there was "... . no attempt directly to control spceech but
rather to protect from an evil shown to be grave, some interest clearly within the sphere of governmental
concern...." See Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 553, 527 (958).
" Three considerations have been put forth as justifications for applying loyalty oaths for all academic
employment. They are that (i) a Communist teacher has no independent judgment and is subservient
to the party line, (a) he is committed to the destruction of freedom, including academic freedom, (3)
the Communist teacher is a member of a criminal conspiracy. After painstaking analysis of these con-
siderations, Professor Brown concludes that the "fact that most teachers are public employees makes them
especially vulnerable to loyalty tests on the grounds advanced with respect to civil servants. On the
other hand, this is a field in which no valid security considerations exist, except in areas of applied
military research that are not primarily part of the business of seeking and transmitting knowledge.'
RALPH S. BRowN, LoYALTr ANr> SECUIrY 333-38, 339 (958).
07 342 U.S. 485 (1952).
ACADEMIC FREEDOM AND LOYALTY OATHS 505
tions and to make membership in any of them prima facie evidence of ineligibility
for continued public school employment. Four teachers"8 attacked the constitution-
ality of the 1949 amendment, arguing that it denied them due proecss of law (i) by
abridging their rights to freedom of speech and association, and (2) by the use of
the presumption which created a prima facie case of disqualification against a teacher,
thereby shifting the burden of proof. By a 6-to-3 vote, the Court upheld these
statutory provisions as constitutional.
In his opinion for the Court, Mr. Justice Minton relied on the now discredited
theory that state employment was a "privilege" and not a "right."99 Regarding the
second argument of the teachers, the Court held that membership in a suspected
organization could properly be relied upon to constitute prima fade grounds for
dismissal without there being a violation of due process. The presumption was
not conclusive, and there was no shifting of the burden of proof. The majority
view was that the relation between the found fact (membership) and the legally
presumed fact (evidence of disqualification) was "clear-and-direct," but not conclusive,
and hence, simply a rule of evidence. The statute required that teachers be given a
hearing before their employment could be terminated. In this situation then, "the
requirements of due process are satisfied." This point appears to have been over-
ruled, sub silentio, by Speiser v. Randall'0 This means then, that only the first
portion of the case remains to be considered.
The Court's opinion dealt with the first and, for purposes of academic freedom,
the important, question in the Adler case. It was whether teachers could be dis-
charged due to their unexplained membership in an organization which the Board
of Regents had listed as one which taught or advocated the doctrine of violent
overthrow of government. Justice Minton cited and relied upon the Garner case
as the Court's sole support for an affirmative answer to this question.
The precedential faith of the Court in the Garner case appears embarrassingly
misplaced for several reasons. First, Garner expressly reserved judgment on the
point for which the Court cited it:1 1
Not before us is the question whether the city may determine that an employee's dis-
closure of such political affiliation [in the Communist Party, U.S.A.] justifies his discharge.
The Garner case spoke only to the question whether, as a condition of employment,
a state's interest in the integrity of its civil service justified an inquiry, by means of
disclaimer oath and affidavit, into a civil servant's associations. Since Garner did not
explore the relationships of such an inquiry to fundamental freedoms protected by
the first and fourteenth amendments, reliance upon it appears doubly misplaced
in Adler's academic freedom context.
" Also, as plaintiffs, there were two parents and two taxpayers.
" Adler v. Board of Education, 342 U.S. 485, 492 (i95).
100 357 U.S. 513 (x958). The case is discussed infra at 507-08.
101 Garner v. Board of Public Works, 341 U.S. 716, 720 (195). It is true that the majority did
uphold the discharge of Pacifico and Schwartz, id. at 724, but it did so without discussion or a vote on the
issue.
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In addition, Garner reasoned by analogy from the type of inquiry conducted
by private industry and held that a similar inquiry would be proper into the
associations of municipal civil servants' 0 2 Except for limitations imposed by the
fourteenth amendment on state action, perhaps this approach is reasonable because
some conditions in private industry and the civil service are analogous. However,
the necessary conditions of academic freedom for the proper functioning of our
universities and schools are certainly not analogous to those necessary for the con-
tinued functioning of private industry or the civil service. Thus, it is to be regretted
that, by a simple citation to precedent, and without a careful exploration of the
underlying vital interests, the Court, unwittingly, decided in the Adler case an issue
presenting considerations of academic freedom fundamentally different from those
found in the precedential cases. Consequently, Adler leaves much to be desired
in both reason and judgment and cannot be considered determinative of the academic
freedom issues presented when loyalty oaths are made a condition of university
employment.
A later case, Wieman v. Updegraff,103 makes it patently clear that if an employee
is under threat of discharge for failure to subscribe to an oath regarding his speech
and associations, then the character of those associations must be known to him.
Innocent or ignorant membership will not suffice; otherwise there would exist guilt
by association. One must know, not only of his own membership in the banned
organization, but also what its true purposes actually are, and any oath not pro-
viding that the affiant possess scienter is constitutionally defective. Another case
requires that a hearing must be afforded an employee to determine whether he
actually had this knowledge.0 4 Furthermore, recent cases suggest that before a
conviction, or, perhaps, a discharge from public employment, can be based on pro-
hibited associational membership, not only must an employee's membership be
"knowing" in the sense described above, but, in addition, it must also be "active."
It must be active in the sense that the member, personally, must have engaged in
promoting the prohibited purposes, i.e., the overthrow of government by force and
violence' 0 5 Thus, it appears that the course of subsequent events has corroded the
vitality of the Adler case.
Recent cases demonstrate a changed attitude in the Court. It seems that now
it will explore and be more sensitive to the interests not considered in Adler. The
1" '"Past conduct may well relate to present fitness; past loyalty may have a reasonable relationship
to present and future trust. Both are commonly inquired into in determining fitness for both high and
low positions in private industry and are not less relevant in public employment." Garner v. Board of
Public Works, 341 U.S. 76, 720 (1951).
103344 U.S. 183 (952).
104 Slochower v. Board of Education, 350 U.S. 551 (1956); Norstrand v. Little, 368 U.S. 436 (1962).
But compare Beilan v. Board of Education, 357 U.S. 399 (x958); Lerner v. Casey, 357 U.S. 468 (1958);
Nelson v. Los Angeles County, 362 U.S. i (196o); Cohen v. Hurley, 366 U.S. 117 (1961); Konigsberg v.
State Bar of California, 353 U.S. 252 (957), 366 U.S. 36 (196z), and In re George Anastaplo, 366 U.S.
82 (196i).
... See Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203 (1961), and Noto v. United States, 367 U.S. 290 (g6i).
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first case demonstrating this perspective is Speiser v. Randall,' which arose in this
way. In 1952 California amended its constitution and attached disabilities to those
persons who advocate the doctrine of violent overthrow of government; the dis-
abilities included the denial of specific tax exemptions. 10 7 By way of implementing
this measure, a California statute was passed which required a disclaimer oath of
non-advocacy from all taxpayers seeking a property tax exemption. This measure
almost reaches the absurdity of requiring a loyalty oath of every citizen. Two
World War II veterans declined to take the oath; they were denied the tax
exemption and brought suit, arguing that the denial of the tax exemption was
unconstitutional and deprived them of due process. On appeal, the United States
Supreme Court agreed.
The importance of the Speiser case lies not in its treatment of the first amendment
issue directly,' but rather in its procedural point as it relates to freedom of speech
and association. In his opinion for the Court, Mr. Justice Brennan noted that
California had placed the burden of proof upon the taxpayers to show that they
were entitled to the tax exemption. This burden was not satisfied when taxpayers
executed the oath, "but throughout the judicial and administrative proceedings the
burden lies on the taxpayer."'0 9  Given this procedure, the question for decision
was whether California constitutionally could use it as a means of locating those
people who do, in fact, advocate the prohibited doctrines." 0 By a vote of 7-to-i, the
Court held that this procedure could not be used. The line between legitimate and
illegitimate expression is shadowy at best, and there always is some degree of error
inherent in legal procedures. Thus, where "the transcendent value of speech is in-
volved, due process certainly requires in the circumstances of this case that the state
bear the burden of persuasion to show that the appellants engaged in criminal
speech.'
But, significantly, the unconstitutional vice in the California procedure was not
simply that of allowing for an occasional error in denying a tax exemption, and there-
by penalizing legitimate speech. Rather, the vice of the procedure lay in its practical
operation. If a man "knows that he must bring forth proof and persuade another
of the lawfulness of his conduct necessarily [he] must steer far wider of the un-
lawful zone than if the State must bear these burdens.""' 2 Thus, California's pro-
cedure was constitutionally defective. "It can only result in a deterrence of speech
106 357 U.S. 513 (1958), but compare, Konigsberg v. California, 366 U.S. 36 (196i). I am in-
debted here to Kalven & Steffen, The Bar Admission Cases, 21 LAw IN TAsMno 155 (ig6i).
1"7 CAL. CoNsT. art. 20, § 19.
... Indeed, the Court assumed "... without deciding that California may deny tax exemptions to
persons who engage in the proscribed speech for which they might be fined or imprisoned." Speiser
v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 520 (1958).
'D Id. at 522.
... Id. at 523. "The question for decision, therefore, is whether this allocation of the burden of proof,
on an issue concerning freedom of speech, falls short of the requirements of due process."
"' Id. at 526.
112 Ibid.
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which the Constitution makes free.'"1 3 In summary, the "procedure, therefore, is
bad because it places an unconstitutional burden on free speech"; 114 hence, the
veterans, in this case, could not be denied a tax exemption for refusing to take the
first step-the oath-in an invalid series.
The implications of Speiser for the Adler case are obvious enough; but what
is exceptional about the Speiser case is its deep commitment to the values found
in freedom of speech and association. In addition, since it did involve a loyalty oath,
the Speiser decision may have marked a shift in the attitude of the Court regarding
the extent to which a state may go when inquiring into a person's speech and
associations as a condition of granting a tax exemption, or perhaps, as a condition of
employment.
Shelton v. Tucker,"5 discussed above,"' was decided two years after Speiser and
appears to maintain the Court's commitment to free speech, specifically including
intellectual liberty. It also shows that the Court is sensitive indeed to the issues
ignored in Adler. The Shelton case in some way goes beyond Speiser and declares
that, where free speech and association are concerned, due process requires that
"the operation and effect of the method by which speech is sought to be restrained
must be subjected to close analysis and critical judgment in the light of the particular
circumstances to which it is applied.""'
Considered in conjunction with Speiser, Shelton can have significant implications
for the blunderbuss approach of loyalty oaths as a means of ferreting out "sub-
versives." The logical extension of these two cases, plus a consideration of the
intellectual values discussed in Sweezy, may mean that, at least in so far as academic
employment is concerned, loyalty oaths will be disallowed as conditions of employ-
ment. The Supreme Court may require that states use a more selective technique.
Another consideration tends to support this conclusion. Apart from the fact that
oaths are utterly inconsistent with meaningful professorial employment, the Court
has recognized in Shelton, unlike Adler and Garner, that notwithstanding a legiti-
mate state interest, inquiries imposed as a condition of employment are subject to
the limitations of the first and fourteenth amendments. The Court held that,
"even though the governmental purpose be legitimate and substantial, that purpose
cannot be pursued by means that broadly stifle fundamental personal liberties when
the end can be more narrowly achieved.""' Thus, it appears possible that the blanket
approach-that is, using loyalty oaths to ferret out subversives-may be found to be
constitutionally incompatible with the necessary conditions required for academic
employment.
At the minimum, Shelton indicates that the Court carefully will measure the
113 Ibid.
"
11 Kalven & Steffen, The Bar Admission Cases, 21 LAw iN TANSInOr 155, x8i (xg6i).
115364 U.S. 479 (g6o).
... See discussion supra at 494-95.
7 Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 520 (196o).
... Id. at 488.
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sweep of an oath to determine whether the breadth of its wording goes beyond
the pale of constitutional permissibility." 9  When coupled with a point in Speiser,
Shelton foreshadows an unhappy constitutional future for loyalty oaths which are
indiscriminate in their expansiveness. Speiser granted as one of its basic premises
the assumption that a state may condition its tax exemptions in such a way as to,
deny them "to persons who engage in the proscribed speech for which they might
be fined or imprisoned.' 2 -  If this assumption is followed in cases dealing with.
state power to prescribe loyalty oaths as conditions for employment, then a state
has power to condition academic employment only on the ground that a professor
disclaim advocacy of speech which that state could criminally punish and no more,
In short, this means that the reach of state loyalty oaths would be measured
by the standards set forth in the Smith Act cases.021 Consequently, lower courts
would have guidelines which would enable them to carry out the Supreme Court's
mandate in Shelton that the "breadth of legislative abridgment must be viewed in
the light of less drastic means for achieving the same basic purpose.'
122
The opinion in the last loyalty oath case decided by the Court 2 3 corroborates its.
sensitivity to the values of free speech exhibited in Speiser. This case establishes
another constitutional fence beyond which loyalty oaths may not venture. Cramp,
a school teacher for nine years, refused to sign Florida's loyalty oath as a condition of
his continued employment. 24 The oath would have required him to swear that
he had never lent his "aid, support, advice, counsel or influence to the Communist
Party."' 25  Cramp brought an action for a declaration that the oath was unconstitu-
tional and that its application to him be enjoined. The Florida courts upheld the
oath-statute over an argument that it was so vague as to deny due process of law,
On appeal, the United States Supreme Court reversed by a vote of 9too.26
Cramp v. Florida establishes that before an oath can pass constitutional muster
it must be cast in terms that are "susceptible of objective measurement."' 27 When
oaths do not reach this standard, but are cast in terms that are fluid and indefinite,
the Court observed that two evils can, and do, occur. On the one hand, the vice
of unconstitutional vagueness requires that a man speak and associate at his peril;
it thereby operates to deter the exercise of individual freedoms and has a potentially
11
' "The unlimited and indiscriminate sweep of the statute now before us brings it within the ban
of our prior cases." Id. at 490.2
o Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 520 (1958).
"See, e.g., Noto v. United States, 367 U.S. 290 (1961); Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203
(196i); Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957); Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (195)-
122 Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (I96o). Also see Louisiana v. NAACP, 366 U.S. 293,
296 (1961), where the Court said that "in an area where, as Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, emphasized,
any regulation must be highly selective in order to survive challenge under the First Amendment."
122 Cramp v. Florida, 368 U.S. 278 (3963). See Note, 34 RocKY Mr. L. REv. 548 (3962).
"' Refusal to sign resulted in an employee's immediate discharge. FLA. STAT. § 876.08 (i953).
a FLA. STAT. § 876.05 (953).
213 Cramp v. Florida, 368 U.S. 278 (1962).
117 Id. at 286.
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inhibiting effect on speech. Thus, "the free dissemination of ideas may be the
loser."'28
On the other hand, unconstitutional vagueness of an oath carries another vice.
It requires that a man must speculate as to the nature of penal laws that may
be applied to him in a perjury trial. "It is not the penalty itself that is invalid but
the exaction of obedience to a rule or standard that is so vague and indefinite as
to be really no rule or standard at all."'29 Due process of law requires that a man
be given clear notice of that speech and those associations which have been pro-
hibited; and stricter standards of clarity apply to laws which have a potentially
deterring impact on freedom of speech.
In its discussion of this last point-possible perjury prosecution-the Court was
careful to note that the compulsion of an oath "might weigh most heavily upon
those whose conscientious scruples were the most sensitive."'80  Evidence has been
found suggesting the truth of this view and that people of principle and high
conscience, and not communists, are the ones who refuse to subscribe to loyalty
-oaths and are the ones most likely to run the risks of perjury actions.13 Additionally,
as though in realization of the significance of the rise of the American right wing,
the Court said that it "would be blinking reality not to acknowledge that there
.are some among us always to aflix a communist label upon those whose ideas
they violently oppose." '132 And, after all, "experience teaches that prosecutors
-too are human."'33
While the Cramp opinion is not particularly helpful in determining precisely
-what terminology would be "susceptible of objective measurement," it does provide
.an example of terms which fail to meet the standard. 34 Its importance is two-fold:
First, it suggests that the Court is willing to take a new look at loyalty oaths as a
condition of employment and is no longer satisfied to decide cases by simple citation
of precedent such as Garner and Adler. Secondly, the Court has established
,another boundary for loyalty oaths; namely, that they must be susceptible of ob-
jective measurement.
CONCLUSION
The requirements, by a state, that its teachers and researchers execute a loyalty
,oath, as a condition of their employment, reflects a basic misunderstanding of the
... Id. at 287.
"O ld. at 286.
' Id. at 286-87.
"'See Byse, A Report on the Pennsylvania Loyalty Act, xox U. PA. L. REv. 480, 482 n.5 (1953).
At California, twenty-six members of the faculty were dismissed for refusing to sign and thirty-seven more
resigned in protest. There is no evidence indicating that any one of them was a communist. See COMMIT-
TEE ON ACADEMIC FREEDOM, INTERIM REPORT TO THE ACADEMIC SENATE, NORTHERN SECTION OF UNIVER-
srry oF CALIFORNIA (1951), and GEORGE R. STEWART, THE YEAR OF THE OATH (1950).
.82 Cramp v. Florida, 368 U.S. 278, 286-87 (r962).
's
5 Id. at 287.
The Court seems to suggest that, perhaps, an oath might inquire into advocacy of violent overthrow
of government or "membership or affiliation with the Communist Party." Id. at 286. On vagueness, see
Note, The Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 1O9 U. PA. L. REv. 67 (xg6o).
ACADEmIC FREEDOM AND LOYALTY OATHS
educational process. It is idle to shirk the fundamental issue involved, for upon its
resolution turns not only the future of loyalty oaths but the course of education
itself. The fundamental cleavage is simply this: there can be no agreement between
those people who regard education as a means of instilling and propagating certain
definite and approved beliefs,' 35 and those other people who think that, above all
else, education should produce a disciplined and critical mind with the power of
independent judgment.
Those people who prescribe loyalty oaths as a condition of academic employment,
consciously or unconsciously, lend their support to the first view. They are clearly
disturbed by the threats to the future of our society which derive from our presently
divided world. No one can be complacent on this matter; there has been nothing
quite like it in our previous history. Our institutions of liberty are being called
... Compare ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, THE BLESSINGS OF LIBERTY 241 n.2 (x956): "The government pays
judges, but it does not tell them how to decide. An independent ... university is as essential to the
community as an independent judiciary."
A direct attack upon academic freedom, and upon meaningful education itself, has been mounting.
This is evidenced by the following statute. FLA. STAT. § 230.23:
"Americanism vs. communism: required high school course.-i. The legislature of the state hereby
finds it to be a fact that
"a. The political ideology commonly known and referred to as communism is in conflict with and
contrary to the principles of constitutional government of the United States as epitomized in its national
constitution.
"b. The successful exploitation and manipulation of youth and student groups throughout the
world to-day are a major challenge which free world forces must meet and defeat, and
"c. The best method of meeting this challenge is to have the youth of the state and nation thor-
oughly and completely informed as to the evils, dangers and fallacies of communism by giving them a
thorough understanding of the entire communist movement, including its history, doctrines, objectives
and techniques.
"2. The public high schools shall each teach a complete course of not less than thirty hours, to all
students enrolled in said public high schools entitled 'Americanism versus communism.'
"3. The course shall provide adequate instruction in the history, doctrines, objectives and techniques
of communism and shall be for the primary purpose of instilling in the minds of the students a greater
appreciation of democratic processes, freedom under law, and the will to preserve that freedom.
"4. The course shall be one of orientation in comparative governments and shall emphasize the free-
enterprise-competitive economy of the United States as the one which produces higher wages, higher
standards of living, greater personal freedom and liberty than any other system of economics on earth.
"5. The course shall lay particular emphasis upon the dangers of communism, the ways to fight com-
munism, the evils of communism, the fallacies of communism, and the false doctrines of communism.
"6. The state textbook committee and the state board of education shall take such action as may
be necessary and appropriate to prescribe suitable textbook and instructional material as provided by
state law, using as one of its guides the official reports of the House Committee on Un-American Activities
and the Senate Internal Security Sub-committee of the United States Congress.
"7. No teacher or textual material assigned to this course shall present communism as preferable to
the system of constitutional government and the free-enterprise-competitive economy indigenous to the
United States.
"8. The course of study hereinabove provided for shall be taught in all of the public high schools of
the state no later than the school year commencing in September 1962. Laws sg6i, c. 61-77, §§ 1-7, 9."
In 962, Louisiana passed a similar statute directing the state department of education, in conjunction
with the local school systems, to conduct seminars for "certain teachers and eleventh and twelfth grade
high school students .... ." The purpose of the seminars is to give their participants "a clear under-
standing of the fundamental principles of the American form of government, the evils of socialism and
the basic philosophy of communism and the strategy and tactics used by the Communists in their efforts
to achieve their ultimate goal of world domination." The statute does not say who the seminar teachers
will be, nor what materials shall be used. See LA. STAT. ANN. R.S. §§ 2851, 2852. For accounts of more
subtle attacks on academic freedom, see JACK NEt.SON & GENE ROBERTS, THx CENSORS AND THE SCHooLS
(1963).
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into question, and should they fall, totalitarianism would rule our homes. In their
fervor to cope with what they perceive as the threat to our free institutions, our
state legislatures appear to have acted on the theory that the only source of attack
is from "communism." They have commonly adopted a method to deal with these
threats which is, simply, that of finding some means whereby one can be assured
that an employee's attitude will favor "Americanism" against communism 80 Thus,
our legislatures usually have enacted loyalty-security programs which, at the
state level, means a heavy reliance upon loyalty oaths. Their aim is to insure the
employment of people who espouse "Americanism." It is believed that in this way
our institutions of liberty can be saved and perpetuated.
A general error of those men who prescribe loyalty oaths as the appropriate
means of dealing with communism is that they confuse loyalty with mere orthodoxy.
Being negatively defined as anti-communism, this concept of "loyalty" suffers from
a provincial myopia.'3 7 There has been a shift to negativism, and it reveals a terrible
fear and distrust which are expressions of the insecurity of our times. Today, anti-
communism is dangerously becoming as doctrinaire as communism itself-and may
come to embrace the root evil of totalitarianism, intolerance. l'8 Inherent in the
anti-communist definition of "loyalty" is the notion that dissent and cultural diversity
can no longer be broadly tolerated. The boundary line between vigorous dissent
and communism has become shadowy. This dividing line and the tensions it
develops are further aggravated by oaths. 3 ' The reason is that, in their zeal to be
sure that they have dealt fully with the problem, state legislatures have cast their
loyalty-oath definitions of anti-communism into loose and general terms. Thus,
the net of orthodoxy spreads.'40 However, as Thomas Jefferson carefully pointed
out, toleration of error is the inescapable condition of the pursuit of truth.
When legislatures require loyalty oaths as conditions for academic employment,
... See, Mundt, The Case for the McCarran Act, in SELECTED READINGS, AMHERST COLLEGE, LOYALTY IN
A DEMOCRATIC STATE 69 (1952), and compare Truman, The Internal Security Act: Veto Message, id. at
77.
13 See A. BARTH, THE LOYALTY oF FREE MEN (1951). The theme of a multiplicity of loyalties is
capably analyzed in MORTON GRODZINS, THE LOYAL AND THE DISLOYAL: SOCIAL BOUNDARIES OF PATRIOTISM
aN TREASON (1956).
"' See materials in note 73 supra.
...Two examples from PAUL LAzARsFELI & WAGNER TMELENS, THE AcnaD.mo MIND (1958),,
illustrate the way in which oaths invade and intimidate professors. At page 223 they report an interview
as follows.
"'In the present state of affairs, I won't join any political group. Almost any group that is trying to.
protect what it thinks is civil liberties, I think could end up on the Attorney General's list. I know
for a fact that in the past contributions by check to certain organizations were photographed, and it gocs
on now. I send no checks to such things.'"
And the other example:
"In explaining his avoidance of political organizations, a respondent who grew up in Nazi GermanT
saw a parallel between the current scene and the experiences of his youth:
"'I don't belong to any and I would be very hesitant to join any. I learned this in Germany in high
school. Never join any group at all. This isn't a case of lack of interest, but experience that something
might turn against you, because in ten years if you join any organization someone might say this was.
subversive.'"
140 See, SaMUEL A. STOUFFER, COMMUNIs M, CONFORMITY AND CIVIL LBERT'7ES (1955).
ACADEIIC FREEDom AND LOYALTY OATHS
they express a fundamental ambivalence toward education. On the one hand, they
want to be sure that, in the present conflict with totalitarianism, our schools
and universities will remain free and courageous in pursuit of truth, thereby de-
veloping conditions necessary for an exercise of critical and independent judgment.
Yet, on the other hand, our state legislatures have done a curious thing. They
have tried to reach this goal by controlling the mind of the professor, insisting that
the teachers and researchers who populate our academic institutions possess basic
opinions and attitudes favoring "Americanism," variously defined as "anti-subversive."
Somehow the necessary assumptions, unsupported by evidence, appear to be that our
colleges and schools are staffed to some degree with advocates of armed revolt, and
that, if let alone, our boards of regents and personnel committees will employ teachers,
and even secretaries, who spread the doctrine of violent overthrow of government.
The dominant thrust of legislative action has been to promote the view that education
is a means of instilling certain definite and approved beliefs and opinions while,
at the same time, trying to give some credence to the thoughts expressed by the
Supreme Court in West Virginia v. Barnette:14 '
If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high
or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion or other
matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein.
That both of these views cannot survive is obvious. They come into focus when
state-prescribed loyalty oaths, as a condition of academic employment, are confronted
with the constitutional protection afforded academic freedom. This issue remains
for the Court to resolve. It seems clear that the balance must be struck in favor
of academic freedom. In educational terms, it is known that the values of a free
society can be achieved only by the use of methods consistent with freedom, and that,
currently, instruction along these lines is woefully inadequate.- 4 The attempt to
teach democratic values by means of indoctrination and propaganda has been held
to have the vice of unconstitutionality within it.'43 The same considerations ought
to prevail in the equally fundamental area of teacher selection where the only
criteria should be, simply, intellectual competence, sincerity, a deep concern for human
welfare, and a tolerance rooted in humility. Knowledge wielded by love is what
our society needs; loyalty oaths do not achieve this goal.
Should the Court strike the balance in favor of academic freedom, it would allow
for the realization of the advice of Thomas Jefferson when he said that a university
should be based "on the illimitable freedom of the human mind . . . we are not
afraid to follow truth wherever it may lead, nor to tolerate any error so long as
reason is left free to combat it."'" Loyalty oaths repudiate Jefferson's understanding.
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The agents of communism have done nothing to our universities and schools which
is potentially more dangerous than what, out of fearful insecurity, they have induced
us to do to ourselves. "To strike freedom of the mind with the fist of patriotism
is an old and ugly subtlety."145 It is contrary to our basic principles and funda-
mental institutions.148 The Constitution guarantees freedom of thought and ex-
pression to all who live in America. "All are entitled to it; and none needs it more
than the teacher. '147
oF THOMAS JEFFERSON 174 (P. L. Ford ed. 1892-99): ". . . the illimitable freedom of the human mind to
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"... More than in most other occupations, the dismissal of a professor jeopardizes or destroys
his eligibility for another position in his occupation. The occupational work of the vast majority
of people is largely independent of their thought and speech. The professor's work consists of his
thought and speech. If he loses his position for what he writes or says, he will, as a rule, have
to leave his profession, and may no longer be able effectively to question and challenge accepted
doctrines or effectively to defend challenged doctrines. And if some professors lose their positions
for what they write or say, the effect on many other professors will be such that their usefulness
to their students and to society will be gravely reduced."
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